This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. An axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, named the Weak Harm Principle, is studied, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty. It is shown that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for social welfare judgements, in both the …nite and the in…nite context. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, a surprisingly strong and general relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition. JEL classi…cation: D63; D70; Q01.
Introduction
What are the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice? Can liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom provide consistent foundations for social welfare judgements? In particular, can a liberal non-interfering approach help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice? What is the relation between liberal political philosophy and the egalitarian tradition stemming from John Rawls's seminal book A Theory of Justice ( [47] )?
This paper addresses these questions, and in so doing it contributes to three di¤erent strands of the literature.
In some recent contributions, Mariotti and Veneziani ([45] , [41] ) have explored a new notion of respect for individual autonomy in social judgements, suited for Social Welfare Orderings (henceforth, swos), whose philosophical roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty. The Principle of Non-Interference embodies the idea that "an individual has the right to prevent society from acting against him in all circumstances of change in his welfare, provided that the welfare of no other individual is a¤ected" ( [45] , p.1).
Formally, the Principle Non-Interference (or Non-Interference, in short) can be illustrated as follows: in a society with two individuals, consider two allocations u = (u 1 ; u 2 ) and v = (v 1 ; v 2 ), describing the welfare levels of the two agents in two alternative scenarios.
Suppose that, for whatever reason, u is strictly socially preferred to v. Suppose then that agent 1 either su¤ers a welfare loss, or enjoys a welfare increase in both allocations, while agent 2's welfare is unchanged, giving rise to two new allocations u 0 = (u 1 + " u ; u 2 ) and v 0 = (v 1 + " v ; v 2 ), with " u " v > 0. Non-Interference says that, if agent 1 strictly prefers u 0 to v 0 , then society should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference for v 0 over u 0 . An agent "can veto society from a strict preference switch after a positive or negative change that a¤ects only [her] and nobody else" ( [45] , p.2).
The veto power accorded to individuals is weak because a switch to indi¤erence is admitted, and because Non-Interference is silent in a number of welfare con…gurations (e.g., if agent 1's welfare changes in opposite directions, " u " v 0, or if she does not strictly prefer u 0 to v 0 ). There are numerous non-dictatorial, and even anonymous swos that satisfy Non-
Interference. Yet, surprisingly, Mariotti and Veneziani ( [45] ) prove that, in societies with a …nite number of agents, dictatorial swos are the only ones compatible with Non-Interference among those satisfying Weak Pareto. 1 Lombardi and Veneziani ( [40] ) and Alcantud ([2] ) have extended this result to societies with a countably in…nite number of agents.
This impossibility proves the limitations of liberal approaches to Paretian social judge- 1 The Anonymity and Weak Pareto axioms are formally de…ned in section 3 below.
ments: there cannot be any 'protected sphere'for individuals even if nobody else is a¤ected.
As Mariotti and Veneziani ([45] , p.2) put it, "Of the appeals of the individuals to be left alone because 'nobody but me has been a¤ected', at least some will necessarily have to be overruled." The …rst contribution of this paper to the literature on liberal approaches is to analyse a speci…c, ethically relevant weakening of Non-Interference and provide a series of positive results, both in the …nite and in the in…nite context.
To be precise, we limit the bite of Non-Interference by giving individuals a veto power only in situations in which they su¤er a decrease in welfare. Arguably, this captures the most intuitive aspect of a liberal ethics of Non-Interference, as it protects individuals in situations where they su¤er a damage, while nobody else is a¤ected: a switch in society's strict preferences against an individual after she has incurred a welfare loss would represent a double punishment for her.
Formally, in the two-agent example above, we restrict Non-Interference to hold in situations where " u ; " v < 0. We call this axiom the Weak Harm Principle -for it represents a strict weakening of the Harm Principle …rst introduced by Mariotti and Veneziani ( [42] )
-and show that a limited liberal ethics of Non-Interference can lead to consistent social judgements. 2 The implications of liberal principles of non-interference (in conjunction with standard axioms in social choice), however, turn out to be fairly surprising. For there exists a strong formal and conceptual relation between liberal views, as incorporated in the Weak Harm Principle, and egalitarian social welfare relations (henceforth, swrs). The analysis of this relation is the second main contribution of the paper.
Formally, we provide a number of fresh characterisations of widely used Rawlsian swrs.
Standard characterisations of the di¤erence principle, or of its lexicographic extension, are based either on informational invariance and separability properties (see, e.g., d'Aspremont [19] ; d'Aspremont and Gevers [20] ) or on axioms with a marked egalitarian content such as the classic Hammond Equity axiom (Hammond [29] , [30] ). 3 We prove that both the Rawlsian di¤erence principle and its lexicographic extension can be characterised based on the Weak Harm Principle, together with standard e¢ ciency, fairness and -where appropriate -continuity properties. The adoption of swrs with a strong egalitarian bias can thus be justi…ed based on a liberal principle of non-interference which is logically distinct from informational invariance and separability axioms, has no egalitarian 2 Mariotti and Veneziani ( [43] ) analyse di¤erent restrictions of Non-Interference and characterise Nashtype orderings. For a related analysis of utilitarianism, see Mariotti and Veneziani ([44] ). 3 See also Tungodden ([57] , [58] ) and Bosmans and Ooghe ( [15] content and indeed has a marked individualistic ‡avour (in the sense of Hammond [31] its relatively simpler structure is a signi…cant advantage, which allows one to capture the core egalitarian intuitions in a technically parsimonious way. Moreover, unlike the leximin, the maximin satis…es continuity and therefore egalitarian judgements based on the di¤erence principle are more robust to small measurement mistakes, e.g. in empirical analysis. This probably explains the wide use of the maximin in modern theories of equality of opportunity (Roemer [48] , [49] ; Gotoh and Yoshihara [28] ), in experimental approaches to distributive justice (Konow [34] ; Bolton and Ockenfels [14] ), in the analysis of the ethics of exhaustible resources and global warming (Solow [56] ; Cairns and Long [21] ; Roemer [51] ; Llavador et al. [37] ), and in the context of intergenerational justice (Silvestre [55] ; Llavador et al. [36] ). 4 In the analysis of integenerational justice and environmental economics, the maximin principle is often taken to embody the very notion of sustainability (Llavador et al. [38] ).
Indeed, and this is the third main contribution of the paper, we analyse liberal and libertarian approaches to intergenerational justice. On the one hand, the intergenerational context provides a natural framework for the application of liberal principles of non-interference. 4 Maximin preferences are prominent also outside of normative economics -for example, in decision theory For there certainly are many economic decisions whose e¤ects do not extend over time and leave the welfare of other generations unchanged. Moreover, liberal principles of noninterference seem to capture some widespread ethical intuitions in intergenerational justice (Wolf [60] ). In the seminal Brundtland report, for example, sustainable development is de-…ned precisely as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (Brundtland [17] , p.43).
On the other hand, the application of liberal principles to intergenerational justice raises complex theoretical and technical issues. Lombardi or transitivity (Sakai [52] ). 5 But the de…nition of suitable anonymous and Paretian swrs is still an open question in the in…nite context (for a thorough discussion, see Asheim [3] ).
Our main contribution to this literature is a novel analysis of liberal egalitarianism in economies with a countably in…nite number of agents.
To be speci…c, we provide a new characterisation of one of the main extensions of the leximin swr in in…nitely-lived societies, namely the leximin overtaking proposed by Asheim and Tungodden ([7] ). As in the …nite-horizon case, we show that the Weak Harm Principle can be used to provide a simple and intuitive characterisation, without appealing to any informational invariance or separability property, or to axioms with an egalitarian content.
Indeed, although we focus on a speci…c extension of the leximin that is prominent in the literature on evaluating in…nite utility streams, our arguments can be modi…ed to obtain new characterisations for all of the main approaches.
We also extend the analysis of Rawls's di¤erence principle to the intergenerational context. As already noted, if the leximin is adopted, social judgements are sensitive to tiny changes in welfare pro…les and measurement errors. In the intergenerational context, an additional issue concerns the signi…cant incompleteness of leximin swrs which may signi…cantly hamper social evaluation in a number of ethically relevant scenarios (see the discussion in Asheim et al. [5] ). Therefore we provide a novel characterisation of the maximin ordering 5 Asheim and Zuber ( [8] ) have recently proposed a complete and transitive extension of the leximin swr which overcomes the impossibility by requiring only sensitivity to the interests of generations whose consumption has …nite rank.
(more precisely, the in…mum rule, Lauwers [35] ) in societies with a countably in…nite number of agents: based on the Weak Harm Principle, we identify a complete egalitarian criterion that allows for robust social evaluation of intergenerational distributive con ‡icts.
Our result di¤ers from other characterisations in the literature in two key respects. Conceptually, the characterisation is again obtained by focusing on standard e¢ ciency, fairness, The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic framework. A permutation is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permutation of N is …nite if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, 8t > T , and is the set of all …nite permutations of N.
For any 1 u 2 X and any permutation , let ( 1 u) = u (t) t2N be a permutation of 1 u. For any T 2 N and 1 u 2 X, 1 u T is a permutation of 1 u T such that the components are ranked in ascending order.
Let < be a (binary) relation over X. For any 1 u,
; < stands for "at least as good as". The asymmetric factor of < is de…ned by 1 u 1 v if and only if 1 u < 1 v and 1 v 6 < 1 u, and the symmetric part s of < is de…ned by 1 u s 1 v if and only if 1 u < 1 v and 1 v < 1 u. They stand, respectively, for "strictly better than"and "indi¤erent to". A relation < on X is said to be: re ‡exive if,
< is a quasi-ordering if it is re ‡exive and transitive. Let < and < 0 be relations on X, we say that < 0 is an extension of < if < < 0 and 0 .
In this paper, we study some desirable properties of quasi-orderings, which incorporate notions of e¢ ciency, fairness and liberal views of non-interference. In this section, we present some basic axioms that are used in the rest of the paper.
A property of swrs that is a priori desirable is that they be able to rank all possible alternatives. Formally:
< is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering.
The standard way of capturing e¢ ciency properties is by means of the Pareto axioms. 6 Strong Pareto, SP:
Weak Pareto, WP:
A basic requirement of fairness is embodied in the following axiom, which requires social judgements to be neutral with respect to agents'identities.
Finite Anonymity, FA:
Finally, in the analysis of intergenerational justice, we follow the literature and consider two mainly technical requirements to deal with in…nite-dimensional vectors (see, e.g., Asheim
and Tungodden [7] ; Basu and Mitra [13] ; Asheim [3] ; Asheim and Banerjee [4] ). 6 The notation for vector inequalities is as follows: for any 1 u,
Preference Continuity, PC:
Weak Preference Continuity, WPC:
These axioms establish "a link to the standard …nite setting of distributive justice, by transforming the comparison of any two in…nite utility paths to an in…nite number of comparisons of utility paths each containing a …nite number of generations"(Asheim and Tungodden [7] ; p.223).
If there are only a …nite set f1; :::; T g = N N of agents, or generations, X T is the set of utility streams of X truncated at T = jN j, where jN j is the cardinality of N . In order to simplify the notation, in economies with a …nite number of agents the symbol u is used instead of 1 u T . With obvious adaptations, the notation and the axioms spelled out above (except for PC and WPC) are carried over utility streams in X T . Indeed, both WP and FA are logically equivalent to the standard weak Pareto and Anonymity axioms in …nite economies, and so we shall use the same acronyms in both the …nite and the in…nite context.
The Weak Harm Principle
We study the implications of liberal views of non-interference in fair and Paretian social welfare judgements. In this section, we de…ne and discuss the main liberal principle and then present a novel characterisation of the leximin ordering.
The key features of liberal, non-interfering views in social choice are captured by the Weak Harm Principle, according to which agents have a right to prevent society from punishing them in all situations in which they su¤er a welfare loss, provided no other agent is a¤ected.
Formally:
WHP captures a liberal view of non-interference whenever individual choices have no e¤ect on others. The decrease in agent i's welfare may be due to negligence or bad luck, but in any case WHP states that society should not strictly prefer v 0 over u 0 : having already su¤ered a welfare loss in both allocations, an adverse switch in society's strict preferences against agent i would represent an unjusti…ed punishment for her.
WHP assigns a veto power to individuals in situations in which they su¤er a harm and no other agent is a¤ected. This veto power is weak in that it only applies to certain welfare con…gurations (individual preferences after the welfare loss must coincide with society's initial preferences) and, crucially, the individual cannot force society's preferences to coincide with her own.
WHP is weaker than the Principle of Non-Interference formulated by Mariotti and v 0 be identical with agent i's, but only that society should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference for v 0 over u 0 (possibly except when i prefers otherwise). This weakening is important for both conceptual and formal reasons.
Conceptually, WHP aims to capture -in a welfaristic framework -a negative freedom that is central in classical liberal and libertarian approaches, namely, freedom from interference from society, when no other individual is a¤ected. The name of the axiom itself is meant to echo J.S. Mill's famous formulation in his essay On Liberty (see Mariotti and Veneziani [41] ). In this sense, by only requiring that agent i should not be punished in the swr by changing social preferences against her, the liberal content of the axiom is much clearer and WHP strongly emphasises the negative prescription of the Harm Principle.
Formally, our weakening of HP has relevant implications for the analysis of liberal egalitarianism. Mariotti and Veneziani ([42] ; Theorem 1, p.126) prove that, jointly with SP, FA, and C, HP characterises the leximin swo, according to which that society is best which lexicographically maximises the welfare of its worst-o¤ members.
The leximin ordering < LM = LM [ s LM on X T is formally de…ned as follows. The asymmetric factor LM of < LM is de…ned by:
The symmetric factor s LM of < LM is de…ned by:
The leximin swo is usually considered to have a strong egalitarian bias, and so a characterisation based on a liberal principle with no explicit egalitarian content is surprising.
To clarify this point, note that the classic characterisation by Hammond ([29] ) states that a swr is the leximin ordering if and only if it satis…es SP, FA, C, and the following axiom.
Hammond Equity, HE:
Unlike the HP, HE expresses a clear concern for equality, for it asserts that among any two welfare allocations which are not Pareto-ranked and di¤er only in two components, society should prefer the more egalitarian one.
Although HE and HP are conceptually distinct and logically independent, it has been argued that the characterisation of the leximin swo in Mariotti and Veneziani ( [42] ) is formally unsurprising, because under FA and C, HP implies HE but the converse is not true (see Alcantud [2] , Proposition 4). 7 This objection does not hold if one considers WHP, instead. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 1 ( Su¢ cientarianism) Suppose that welfare units can be normalised so that a zero welfare level represents a decent living standard. Then one can de…ne a swr < s on X T according to which that society is best in which the highest number of people reach a decent living standard. Formally, 8u 2 X T let P (u) = fi 2 N : u i 0g and let jP (u)j denote the cardinality of P (u). Then 8u; v 2 X T :
It is immediate to see that < s on X T is an ordering and it satis…es FA and WHP, but violates both HE and HP. 8 Observe that the absence of any conceptual and formal relations between WHP and HE, even under FA, established in Example 1 is not a mere technical artefact. The Suppes-Sen grading principle, for instance, satis…es FA and WHP and violates HE, but one may object that this is due to its incompleteness. In contrast, the swr in Example 1 is complete and it embodies a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and social choice (see, for example, Frankfurt [26] and Roemer [50] ). Thus, even under FA and C, liberal principles of non-interference embody substantially di¤erent normative intuitions than standard equity axioms. Example 1 also highlights the theoretical relevance of our weakening of the Harm Principle, for the WHP is consistent with a wider class of swos, 7 The argument is originally due to François Maniquet in unpublished correspondence. 8 Consider, for example, two welfare pro…les u; v 2 X T such that u = (2; 5; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1) and v = ( 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1). By de…nition u s v, which violates HE.
including some -such as the su¢ cientarian -which embody some widely shared views on distributive justice.
Given this, it is perhaps surprising that the characterisation result provided in Mariotti and Veneziani ( [42] ) can be strengthened. 9 Veneziani [41] ). Together with Example 1, this implies that Proposition 2 is far from trivial.
For even under C and either FA or SP, WHP is not stronger than HE, and it is actually strictly weaker, at least in some cases.
Third, Proposition 2 puts the normative foundations of leximin under a rather di¤erent light. For, unlike in standard results, the egalitarian swo is characterised without appealing to any axioms with a clear egalitarian content. 10 
Liberal egalitarianism reconsidered
One common objection to the leximin swo is its sensitivity to small changes in welfare pro…les, and so to measurement errors and small variations in policies. Albeit possibly 9 The properties in Proposition 2 are clearly independent. The proof of Proposition 2 is a generalisation of the proof of Theorem 1 in Mariotti and Veneziani ( [42] ) and is in Appendix 1. 10 Nor to any invariance or separability axioms. secondary in theoretical analyses, these issues are relevant in empirical applications and policy debates. In this section, we study the implications of liberal non-interfering approaches for social evaluations that are robust to small changes in welfare.
A standard way of capturing this property is by an interpro…le condition requiring the swo to vary continuously with changes in utility streams.
Continuity, CON: 8u 2 X T , the sets fv 2 X T jv < ug and fv 2 X T ju < vg are closed.
By Proposition 2, if CON is imposed in addition to WHP, C, SP and FA an impossibility result immediately obtains. Therefore we weaken our Paretian requirement to focus on WP. Strikingly, the combination of the …ve axioms characterises Rawls's di¤erence principle.
The maximin ordering < M on X T is de…ned as follows:
Theorem 3 states that the standard requirements of fairness (FA), e¢ ciency (WP), completeness (C), and continuity (CON), together with our liberal axiom characterise the maximin swo. 11
Theorem 3 : A swr < on X T is the maximin ordering if and only if it satis…es FA, WP, C, CON, and WHP.
Proof. ()) Let < on X T be the maximin ordering, i.e., <=< M . It can be easily veri…ed that < M on X T satis…es FA, WP, C, CON, and WHP.
(() Let < on X T be a swr satisfying FA, WP, C, CON, and WHP. We show that < is the maximin swo. We prove that, 8u, v 2 X T ,
and
Note that as < on X T satis…es FA, in what follows we can focus either on u and v, or on the ranked vectors u and v, without loss of generality.
First, we show that the implication ()) of (1) is satis…ed. Take any u; v 2 X T . Suppose that u M v , u 1 > v 1 . We proceed by contradiction, …rst proving that v u is impossible and then ruling out v u. 11 The properties in Theorem 3 are clearly independent.
Suppose that v u, or equivalently, v u. As WP holds, v j u j for some j 2 N , otherwise a contradiction immediately obtains. We proceed according to the following steps.
Step 1. Let k = min fl 2 N j v l u l g .
By FA, let v i = v k and let u i = u 1 . Then, consider two real numbers d 1 , d 2 > 0, and two vectors u 0 , v -together with the corresponding ranked vectors u 0 , v 2 X T -formed from u, v as follows: u 1 is lowered to
and all other entries of u and v are unchanged. By construction u 0 j > v j for all j k, whereas by WHP, C, and FA, we have v < u 0 .
Step 2. Let
The above steps 1-2 can be applied to u 0 , v 0 to derive vectors u 00 , v 00 such that u 00 j > v 00 j for all j k 0 , whereas v 00 u 00 . By WP, a contradiction is obtained whenever u 00 j > v 00 j for all j 2 N . Otherwise, let v 00 l u 00 l for some l > k 0 . And so on. After a …nite number s of iterations, two vectors u s , v s can be derived such that v s u s , by steps 1-2, but u s v s , by WP, a contradiction.
Therefore, by C, it must be u < v whenever u M v. We have to rule out the possibility that u v. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that u v. Since v 1 < u 1 , there exists > 0 such that v = v + con and v 1 < u 1 so that u M v . However, by WP and transitivity of < it follows that v u. Then the above reasoning can be applied to v and u to obtain the desired contradiction. Now, we show that the implication ()) of (2) is met as well. Suppose that u M v , 
The Weak Harm Principle and intergenerational justice
In the previous sections, we have studied the implications of liberal principles of noninterference in societies with a …nite number of agents and have shown that consistent fair and Paretian liberal social judgements are possible. We now extend our analysis to societies with an in…nite number of agents. A liberal non-interfering approach seems particularly appropriate in the analysis of intergenerational distributive issues: although the welfare of a generation is often a¤ected by decisions taken by their predecessors, there certainly are many economic decisions whose e¤ects do not extend over time and leave the welfare of other generations unchanged. In this section (and the next), we show that a consistent fair and Paretian liberal approach to intergenerational justice is indeed possible.
The extension of the main liberal principle to the analysis of intergenerational justice is rather straightforward and needs no further comment, except possibly noting that in this context, WHP is weakened to hold only for pairs of welfare allocations whose tails can be Pareto-ranked.
Weak Harm Principle, WHP : 8 1 u, 1 v, 1 u 0 , 1 v 0 2 X : 1 u 1 v and 9T 1; 9 0 such that 1 v ( 1 v T ; ( T +1 u + con )), and 1 u 0 , 1 v 0 are such that, 9i T ,
As already noted, economies with an in…nite number of agents raise several issues concerning the existence and the characterisation of swos, and di¤erent de…nitions of the main criteria (including utilitarianism, egalitarianism, the Nash ordering, and so on) can be pro- In order to characterise the leximin overtaking, we also require that the swr be at least able to compare pro…les with the same tail. This seems an obviously desirable property which imposes a minimum requirement of completeness on the swr.
Minimal Completeness, MC: and WPC. 12 The proof that the properties in Theorem 4 are independent is in Appendix 2.
Proof ()) Let < LM <. It is easy to see that < meets FA and SP. By observing that < LM is complete for comparisons between utility streams with the same tail it is also easy to see that < satis…es MC and WPC.
We show that < meets WHP . Take any 1 u, 1 v, 1 u 0 , 1 v 0 2 X such that 1 u 1 v, and 9T 1; 9 0 such that 1 v ( 1 v T ; ( T +1 u + con )), and 1 u 0 , 1 v 0 are such that 9i T , . Take any 1 u, 1 v 2 X.
for any T T . It follows that 1 u 1 v, by FA.
Suppose that 1 u LM 1 v. By de…nition, 9T 1 : 8T T 9t 2 f1; :::; T g such that u s = v s 81 s < t and u t > v t . Take any such T and consider 1 w
We show that 1 w 1 v. By FA and transitivity, we can consider 1 w ( 1 u T ,
. By MC, suppose that 1 v < 1 w. We distinguish two cases.
As SP holds it must be the case that v l > w l for some l > t. Let
By FA, let v i = v k and let w i = w k g , for some 1 g < k, where w k g > v k g . Then, let two real numbers d 1 , d 2 > 0, and consider vectors 1 w 0 , 1 v 0 formed from 1 w, 1 v as follows:
and all other entries of 1 w and 1 v are unchanged. By FA, consider
whereas WHP , combined with MC and FA, implies 1 v 0 < 1 w 0 . Furthermore, by SP, it is possible to choose d 1 , d 2 > 0, such that 1 v 0 1 w 0 , without loss of generality. Consider two cases: a) Suppose that v k > w k , but w l v l for all l > k. It follows that 1 w 0 > 1 v 0 , and so SP implies that 1 w 0 1 v 0 , a contradiction. b) Suppose that v l > w l for some l > k. Note that by construction v 0 l = v l and w 0 l = w l for all l > k. Then, let
The above argument can be applied to 1 w 0 , 1 v 0 to derive vectors 1 w 00 , 1 v 00 such that w 00 j v 00 j for all j k 0 , whereas WHP , combined with MC, FA, and SP, implies 1 v 00 1 w 00 . And so on. After a …nite number of iterations s, two vectors 1 w s , 1 v s can be derived such that, by WHP , combined with MC, FA, and SP, we have that 1 v s 1 w s , but SP implies 1 w s 1 v s , yielding a contradiction.
Let 1 w 2 X be a vector such that w t = w t and w j = w j for all j 6 = t. It follows that 1 w LM 1 v but 1 v 1 w by SP and the transitivity of <. Hence, the argument of Case 1 above can be applied to 1 v and 1 w , yielding the desired contradiction.
It follows from MC that 1 w 1 v. FA, combined with the transitivity of <, implies that based on WHP , thus con…rming the striking link between a liberal and libertarian concern for individual autonomy, and egalitarian criteria.
These conclusions are robust and can be extended to alternative de…nitions of the leximin criterion. 13 5] ). 15 In summary, in the intergenerational context too, liberalism implies equality. 16 6 Liberal egalitarianism extended
In section 4, we argued that a potential shortcoming of the leximin criterion is its sensitivity to in…nitesimal changes in welfare pro…les and explored the implications of liberal principles together with a continuity requirement that incorporates a concern for robustness in social judgements. In the context of intergenerational distributive justice, a further problem of the various extensions of the leximin criterion is their incompleteness, which makes them unable to produce social judgements in a large class of pairwise comparisons of welfare pro…les.
In this section, we complete our analysis of liberal principles of non-interference by analysing the implications of WHP in adjudicating intergenerational distributive con ‡icts when social welfare criteria are required to be continuous and to be able to adjudicate all distributive con ‡icts. This is by no means a trivial question, for it is well known that continuity is a problematic requirement for swos in economies with an in…nite number of agents and impossibility results easily arise (Hara et al. [32] ; Zame [61] ).
As a …rst step, we shall slightly restrict our state space as follows:
This is a mild restriction, which yields no signi…cant loss of generality and follows a common practice in the literature on intergenerational justice (e.g., Lauwers [35] ; Basu and
Mitra [12] , [13] ; Zame [61] ; Hara et al. [32] ; Asheim [3] ; Asheim and Banerjee [4] ). 17 The main axioms incorporating completeness, fairness, e¢ ciency, and liberal non-interference are the same as in previous sections, given the domain restriction. 15 As compared to the standard overtaking criterion, the time invariant version does not rely on a natural ordering of generations. Thus, it is possible to drop WPC and replace it with a similar consistency axiom that does not entail a preference for earlier generations. 16 The proofs of the above claims are available from the authors upon request. 17 The restriction can also be motivated theoretically. For example, Mariotti and Veneziani ([43] , [44] )
argue that opportunities should be conceptualised as chances in life, or probabilities of success, and study allocation criteria on the T -dimensional unit box. We note in passing that our main conclusions continue to hold even if one allows for welfare pro…les that are unbounded above, albeit at the cost of some changes in the axiomatic system.
Because the set of in…nite bounded vectors has no natural topology, we follow Lauwers ([35] ) and de…ne continuity based on the sup metric.
Sup Continuity, CON d1 : 8 1 u 2 X : there is a sequence of vectors 1 v k 1 k=1 such that lim k!1 1 v k = 1 v 2 X with respect to the sup metric d 1 , and 1 v k < 1 u (resp., 1 
Observe that in general CON d1 is weaker than the standard continuity axiom but it is equivalent to the latter if the swr is complete. 18 Our next result extends the key insights on liberal egalitarianism to the intergenerational context. Formally, the maximin swo < M on X can be de…ned as follows:
Theorem 5 proves that Finite Anonymity, Weak Pareto, Completeness, Sup Continuity, Weak Harm Principle, and Preference Continuity characterise < M on X. 19 Theorem 5 A swr < on X is the maximin swo if and only if it satis…es FA, WP, C, CON d1 , WHP , and PC.
Proof. ()) Let < on X be the maximin swo, i.e., <=< M . It can be easily veri…ed that < M on X satis…es FA, WP, C, CON d1 , WHP , and PC.
(() Let < on X be a swr satisfying FA, WP, C, CON d1 , WHP , and PC. We show that < is the maximin swo. To this end, it su¢ ces to show that
Consider (3). Take any 1 u, 1 v 2 X such that inf t2N u t > inf t2N v t . In order to prove that 18 It is also weaker than the Continuity axiom recently proposed by Asheim et al. ([6] , p.271), although the two properties are equivalent for complete swrs. 19 The proof that the properties in Theorem 5 are independent is in Appendix 2. It is worth noting in passing that the characterisation of the maximin swo can also be obtained without the full force of completeness, by adopting an axiom similar to MC above. We thank Geir Asheim for suggesting this to us.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that (5) fails. Since < satis…es C, it follows that for any T 1 there exist t T and > 0 such that 1 v ( 1xt ; t+1 v + con ). Sincê
x > inf t2N v t , it follows that there exists T 1 such thatx > v T minfv 1 ; :::; v T g. By the contradicting hypothesis, and since < satis…es C, there exist t T and > 0 such that
For the sake of notational simplicity, let ( 1xt ; t +1 v + con ) 1 x.
Observe thatx > minfv 1 ; :::; v T g minfv 1 ; :::
Then, there exists 0 < a < min minfx t v t jt t g; 2 such that x t v t + a for all t 2 N. But then WP implies 1 x 1 v yielding a contradiction.
Therefore, suppose that for some 1 < t t we have that v t x t =x. We proceed according to the following steps.
Step 1. Let
Then, consider two real numbers d 1 , d 2 > 0, and two vectors 1 x 1 , 1 v 0 -together with the corresponding ranked vectors 1
and all other entries of 1 x and 1 v are unchanged. By construction
t > v 0 t for all 1 t q, whereas by WHP , C, FA, we have
and de…ne 1 v 1 = 1 v 0 + con k. By construction, v 1 t v 0 t + k for all t 2 N, and so WP implies 1 v 1 1 v 0 . By (6) and transitivity, it follows that 1 v 1 1 x 1 . Theorem 5 thus con…rms the main intuitions concerning the relation between liberal and egalitarian approaches: the application of WHP, together with standard fairness, e¢ ciency, and continuity properties leads straight to intergenerational welfare egalitarianism. 20 Formally, for any two bounded in…nite vectors 1 u, 1 v such that u i v i v j u j for some i; j 2 N and u k = v k 8k 2 Nnfi; jg, 1 v < 1 u (Lauwers [35] , p.46). (() Let < on X T be a swo satisfying SP, FA, C, and WHP. We show that < on X T is the leximin swo. Thus, we should prove that, 8u, v 2 X T ,
Conclusions
First, we prove the implication ()) of (8) . If u LM v, then u = v, and so u v, by FA.
Next, we prove the implication ()) of (9) . Suppose that u LM v, and so, by de…nition u 1 > v 1 or 9t 2 f2; :::; T g such that u s = v s 81 s < t and u t > v t . Suppose, by contradiction, that v u. Note that since < satis…es FA, in what follows we can focus, without loss of generality, either on u and v, or on the ranked vectors u and v. Therefore, suppose v u. As SP holds it must be the case that v l > u l for some l > t. Let
By FA, let v i = v k and let u i = u k g , for some 1 g < k, where u k g > v k g . Then, let two real numbers d 1 , d 2 > 0, and consider vectors u 0 , v 0 and the corresponding ranked vectors u 0 , v 0 formed from u, v as follows: …rst, u k g is lowered to u k g d 1 such that
…nally, all other entries of u and v are unchanged. By construction u 0 j v 0 j for all j k, with u 0 k g > v 0 k g , whereas WHP, combined with C, and FA, implies v 0 < u 0 . By SP, d 1 , d 2 > 0 can be chosen so that v 0 u 0 , without loss of generality. Consider two cases: a) Suppose that v k > u k , but u l v l for all l > k. It follows that u 0 > v 0 , and so SP implies that u 0 v 0 , a contradiction. b) Suppose that v l > u l for some l > k. Note that by construction v 0 l = v l and u 0 l = u l for all l > k. Then, let k 0 = minfk < l T j v 0 l > u 0 l g. The above argument can be applied to u 0 , v 0 to derive vectors u 00 , v 00 such that u 00 j v 00 j for all j k 0 , whereas WHP, combined with FA, C, and SP, implies v 00 u 00 . And so on.
After a …nite number of iterations s, two vectors u s , v s can be derived such that, by WHP, combined with FA, C, and SP, we have that v s u s , but u s > v s so that SP implies u s v s , yielding a contradiction.
We have proved that if u LM v then u < v: Suppose now, by contradiction, that v u, or equivalently v u. Since, by our supposition, v t < u t , there exists > 0 such that v t < u t < u t . Let u 2 X T be a vector such that u t = u t and u j = u j for all j 6 = t.
It follows that u LM v but v u by SP and the transitivity of <. Hence, the above argument can be applied to v and u , yielding the desired contradiction.
Appendix 2: Independence of Axioms
The proofs of the independence of the axioms used to characterise the …nite maximin and leximin swos are obvious and therefore they are omitted. It is worth noting, however, that some of the examples below can be easily adapted to apply to the …nite context.
Independence of axioms used in Theorem 4
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4, we show that the axioms are tight.
For an example violating only FA, de…ne < on X as follows: 8 1 u; 1 v 2 X,
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr < LM . The swr < on X satis…es all axioms except FA.
For an example violating only SP, de…ne < on X as follows: 8 1 u; 1 v 2 X, 1 u 1 v. The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr < LM . The swr < on X satis…es all axioms except SP.
For an example violating only WHP , de…ne < on X as follows:
T ; 9t 2 f1; :::; T g with u s = v s ( 8t < s T ) and u t > v t :
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr < LM . The swr < on X satis…es all axioms except WHP .
For an example violating only MC, let for any T 2 N and 1 u 2 X, T ( 1 u T ) be a permutation of 1 u T . Then de…ne < on X as follows: 8 1 u, 1 v 2 X, 1 u 1 v , 9T 1 such that 8T T : 1 u T = T ( 1 v T ) for some permutation T ;
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr < LM . The swr < on X satis…es all axioms except MC. Independence of axioms used in Theorem 5
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 5, we show that the axioms are tight.
< is a swo on X and it satis…es all axioms except FA.
For an example violating only WP, de…ne < on X as follows:
is a swo on X and it satis…es all axioms except WP.
For an example violating only PC, de…ne < on X as follows:
< is a swo on X and it satis…es all axioms except PC.
[To see that PC is violated, consider the pro…les 1 u = con 0 and 1 v = con 1. By construction,
Let the following notation hold for the next two examples. De…ne X as follows:
For all 1 u 2 X , let t( 1 u) be one of the generations such that u t( 1 u) = min t2N u t .
For an example violating only WHP , de…ne < on X as follows: 8 1 u, 1 v 2 X, (i) if 1 u, 1 v 2 X , then 1 u < 1 v , min t2N ut+inf t2Nnft( 1 u)g ut 2 min t2N vt+inf t2Nnft( 1 v)g vt 2 ;
(ii) if 1 u 2 X , 1 v 2 Xn X , then 1 u < 1 v ,
< is a swo on X and it satis…es all axioms except WHP . [To see that WHP is violated, consider the pro…les 1 u = (1, con 6), 1 v = con 3, 1 u 0 = (1; 3, con 6), and 1 v 0 = (3; 2, con 3). By the de…nition of <, 1 u 1 v, but 1 v 0 1 u 0 , which contradicts WHP .] For an example violating only CON d1 , de…ne < on X as follows:
(ii) if 1 u, 1 v 2 X and u t( 1 u) = v t( 1 v) , then 1 u < 1 v , inf
(iii) if 1 u 2 Xn X , 1 v 2 X , and inf t2N u t = min t2N v t , then 1 u 1 v;
(iv) if 1 u, 1 v 2 Xn X , and inf t2N u t = inf t2N v t , then 1 u 1 v.
< is a swo on X and it satis…es all axioms except CON d1 . [To see that CON d1 is violated, consider the pro…les 1 u k = ( 1 k ; con 1); k 2 N, and 1 v = (0; con 2). Observe that 1 v 2 X , 1 u k 2 X 8k 2 N and lim k!1 1 u k = (0; con 1) 2 X . By the de…nition of <, 1 u k < 1 v 8k 2 N, but 1 v (0; con 1), which contradicts CON d1 .]
For an example violating only C, de…ne < on X as follows: 8 1 u, 1 v 2 X, 1 u 1 v , 1 u = ( 1 v) for some 2 ;
1 u 1 v , 9 > 0 : 1 u ( 1 v) + con , for some 2 .
< is a swr on X and it satis…es all axioms except C.
